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TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-DUTY TO STOP, LOOK AND
LisTEN.-The Supreme Court of Appeals in a recent case,' has
corrected a false impression of the rule in West Virginia regard-

ing the care to be exercised by a traveler before attempting to
cross a railroad track. The misunderstanding arose from the language used in the syllabus in the case of Cline v. AcAdoo, 2 which
is as follows: "As many times decided, it is the duty of a traveler
on a public highway, on approaching a railroad crossing, to stop,
look and listen, without which, if injured, he will be guilty, of
contributory negligence."
This statement has led at least one
into
errors
and
has
resulted in West Virginia being
trial court
classed with Pennsylvania, in a widely read text-book,4 as holding
that the duty to stop, look and listen is absolute.
In the case of Bonar v. Baltimore & Oltio R. Co.,5 plaintiff's
automobile, while crossing the tracks, was struck by defendant's
engine. The defense was contributory negligence. It appeared
I

Bonar v,. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 113 S. E. 766 (W. Va. 1922).
2 85 W. Va. 524, 102 S. E. 218 (1920).
s Bonar v. Baltimore & 0. R., sapra, note 1.
BBERIY, THE LAw oF AUTOMOBILES, 3rd ed., p. 674.
S upra, note I.
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that plaintiff looked and listened but did not stop. The lower
court instructed the jury to find for the defendant if the plaintiff did not stop, look and listen. From an order setting aside a
verdict for him, plaintiff brought error. The Supreme Court of
Appeals reversed the order and gave judgment for plaintiff on
the verdict on the ground that the question whether the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence in not stopping under the
circumstances was for the jury. The opinion states that the West
Virginia court has never held that there is an absolute duty,
under any and all circumstances, for a traveler to stop, look and
listen for approaching trains, "but his failure to do so is a circumstance for the jury to consider in determining the degree of
care exercised by him," and that the language of the syllabus in
Cline v. McAdoo, supra, is, "perhaps broader than is warranted
by the facts in that case."
Out of the confusion, resulting mainly from the method of
statement,7 three distinct rules regarding the necessity of stopping,
looking and listening before crossing a railroad track have
emerged, under which most, if not all, of the decisions can be
grouped. In two jurisdictions, Pennsylvania and Alabama, the
duty to stop, look and listen is held to be absolute, and a failure
to do any one is contributory negligence as a matter of law.8 This
has been qualified somewhat in Alabama0 by holding that it is
not negligence to fail to stop, look and listen if one is not in a
position to do so, or if the conditions are such that one could not
see or hear the approaching train by doing so. This rule has met
with little favor as it is thought to put too great a restriction
upon the privilege of the public in using the highways. 10 The court
of no other state has seen fit to require the traveler to stop under
all circumstances, although some have imposed this duty where
the view is obstructed," and this seems to be the rule of the Federal Courts. 2
Under the second rule, the failure to stop is not absolute, but
a failure to look and listen is negligence per so."' The duty to stop
6 Xbd, at page 767.
7 Stearns v. Boston & R. Co., 75 N. H. 40, 71 Atl. 21, 21 Ann. Cas. 1166 (1808).
8 Aiken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 130 Pa. 380, 18 Atl. 619, 17 Am. St. Rep. 775
(1889) ; Benner v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 267 Pa. 307, 105 Atl. 283 (1918);
Atlantic Coast Line R. R.. -. Jones, 202 Ala. 222, 80 So. 44 (1918) ; Hines, Director
General'.. Cooper, 204 Ala. 535, 86 So. 396 (1920).
9 Georgia Cent. R. Co. v). Hyatt, 151 Ala. 355, 43 So. 867 (1907).
10 See 21 COL. L. REv. 291.
u Chase -v. Ifaine Cent. Ry., 167 Mass. 383, 45 N. E. 911 (1897).
12 Shatto v. Erie I. Co. 121 Fed. 678, 59 C. C. A. 1 (1903).
" Little Rock & R. Co. v. Blewitt, 65 Ark. 235, 45 S. W. 548 (1898) - Castle v.
Director General of Railroads, 232 N. Y. 430, 134 N. E. 334 (1922).
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is a relative one, depending upon the facts of the particular case,
the knowledge the traveler has of the situation and the reliance
he may reasonably place on his opportunities for seeing and hearing without taking the. precaution of stopping, and the determination of its necessity is left to the jury. This rule also prescribes
a quantum of care, but is more reasonable in its requirements
and conforms more closely to the conduct of the average traveler.
The third rule requires only such care as is exercised by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.' 4 The question of the necessity for looking and listening
as well as stopping, is to be left to the jury unless the facts and
circumstances are such as to justify the direction of a verdict.
This would seem to be the soundest of the three rules and represents the view of a majority of our courts. 5 That it is open to
abuse by juries is true,18 but this can be prevented to a great extent by the courts if they are not too backward in directing verdicts.
While the West Virginia Court has negatived plainly an adherence to the first of these rules, 17 it has not so clearly indicated
which of the other two it would follow. It quotes with approval' 8
the rule laid down in City of Elkins v. Western Maryland R.
Co.," which says: "It is not negligence per se in all cases for
travelers upon a public street or road, on approaching a railroad
crossing, not to stop, as well as to look and listen, before attempting
to cross the track. Whether one has been negligent in failing to
stop is generally presented as a mixed question of law and fact,
to be submited to the jury, and not as one of law, for the judgment of the court." While this would indicate that the only question for the jury was whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to
stop, the court also says20 "but the opinion in that case (Cline v.
McAdoo) shows that other facts and circumstances may be shown
so as to excuse the plaintiff from stopping, looking and listening,
or at least such as will carry the case to the jury on whether the
plaintiff did or did not act under the circumstances as a reasonable and prudent man would have done; in other words whether
plaintiff was guilty of contributing negligence is a question for
14Texas & N. 0. R. R. o. Harrlngton, 234 S. W. 188 (Texas 1921).
13 Loughman v. Hines, 117 Wash. 166, 200 Pac. 1086 (1921) ; Murden V. Va.
1R.& W. Power Co., 130 Va. 449, 107 S. E. 660 (1921) ; and 'numerous cases cited
in note in 1 A. L. I. 203.
18 See 21 COL. L. REv. 291.
17 Bonar v. Baltimore & 0. n. P., sulra, note 1 at page 767..
*- 76 W. Va. 733, 88 S. E. 762, 1 A. L. R. 198 (1915).
Boner v. Baltimore & 0. B.. BR.supra, note 1 at page 767.
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the jury." From this it would appear that the jury is expected
not only to pass on the question of the necessity for stopping, but
also to decide whether under the circumstances, a failure to look
and listen was negligence. It would be helpful to the courts and
to the profession if the extent of the jury's participation in these
cases were more clearly defined.
-E. C. D.
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